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1.  Introduction 
In recent times, the availability of information (so-called big data) increases the importance of 
systematic data collection, data processing, data analysis and implementation in various busi-
nesses and value chains. The possibility to benefit from data analysis changes (i) industrial-
ized processes (as in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine-to-machine (M2M) communica-
tion) and (ii) services based on consumer information. The latter is built on personalized data, 
i.e. the specific collection of individual information and preferences. It includes both “stand-
ard” data (i.e. mail address, name, payment information, gender, etc.), and “advanced” con-
sumer data regarding stated and revealed preferences (e.g. stated: like-button on Instagram; 
revealed: videos I am actually watching, products I am actually buying) (Budzinski & Kuchin-
ke, 2020). By combining those two data types and through connecting with data of people 
with similar behavior and interests so called “derived” data arise which algorithms then alto-
gether can process. Advanced data and sophisticated methods of analysis make it possible to 
draw conclusions about the consumer’s individual consumption habits and discover connec-
tions between different behavior- and preference-types over various consumers. People have 
become accustomed to “paying-with-data”; they provide information to use different services 
like apps, websites or social media – oftentimes without having to pay monetarily in return. 
Three stylized types of business models build on the idea of (consumer) data as payment 
(Budzinski & Kuchinke, 2020): (i) user data analysis for third parties, e.g. user-behavior anal-
yses for upstream markets or targeting advertising content on the behalf of companies, (ii) 
individualized pricing (price discrimination based on data-based estimates of willingness to 
pay and consumption patterns), (iii) individualized services (tailor-made products and services 
for consumers). In digital markets, business success is very often rooted in the professional 
implementation of these individualized services (as in iii). Successful media services like 
YouTube, Netflix, Spotify, and Instagram but also online shops like Amazon and Zalando 
benefit from individualized search and recommendation services (SRS) and are in the focus of 
attention for this article. Think of product recommendations on Amazon based on your previ-
ous searching behavior, your top selection on Netflix based on your previous viewing behav-
ior, your personalized playlist “Discover Weekly” on Spotify or profile recommendations on 
Instagram based on profiles you already follow. The provided consumer data is used for tai-
lor-made search results and recommendations within the platform in order to increase the con-
sumers’ consumption (time) which in turn benefits the platform since the more user infor-
mation is available the better the SRS and algorithms can work (Belleflamme & Peitz, 2020). 
The success of these SRS can be seen in the following numbers: according to Netflix already 
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80 per cent of the content that is watched is based on recommendations (Morgan, 2019). Sim-
ilar and according to Spotify already over 40 million people had turned to the “Discover 
Weekly” playlist in 2016, not even a year after it had been launched (Prey, 2018). For Ama-
zon, MacKenzie et al. (2013) revealed already 7 years ago that 35% of the consumer purchas-
es resulted from algorithm-based product recommendations.  
Different studies (inter alia: Accenture, 2018; PwC, 2019; Deloitte, 2019) indicate consumers’ 
wish and demand for personalization. Consumers want their personal needs and preferences to 
be met and accordingly ask for relevant and personalized content, goods, services and/or ex-
perience. In that regard algorithmic SRS seem helpful – providing pre-structuring assistance 
(i.e. rankings and recommendations) to cope with the vast amount of information (information 
overload) available in the digital world. Other voices, however, speak of gatekeeper effects 
(Bozdag, 2013) or even commercial hypernudging strategies (Morozovaite, 2020) going along 
with (algorithmic) personalization services used by digital platforms.   
Taking these quite contrary standpoints, this article aims at providing a differentiated, system-
atic overview and detailed understanding of algorithmic SRS. Section 2 provides information 
on types of recommendations, good characteristics and definition of SRS within our research. 
Section 3 contains the economic discussion, with a literature overview as well as the analysis 
of positive and negative welfare effects of SRS. Section 4 retrieves both managerial and regu-
latory implications of the preceding analysis and concludes. 
 
2. Search and Recommendation Services as a Commercial Good 
2.1  What are (not) Search and Recommender Services? 
A “good recommendation” is very valuable information, which can be understood as kind 
advice. The quality of this information can (usually) only be evaluated after consumption (ex-
perience good). In specific cases, even after consumption a perfect quality estimation is not 
possible (credence good) (Nelson, 1970; Wolinsky, 1995). Generally, SRS can be described as 
experience goods, since consumers only know the quality of a recommendation after con-
sumption i.e. being definitely (un)satisfied with their choice afterwards. However, if consum-
ers are not sure if the system’s suggestions were of good or bad quality, SRS can also have 
credence good characteristics. This can be the case, for instance, if consumers do quickly rely 
on recommendations without further research and, hence, not exactly know opportunity costs 
i.e. what they would have consumed with different recommendations. They have to trust the 
system and believe in the suitability of the recommendation. Experience and credence goods 
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come with imperfect information; if one market side (either demand or supply side) systemat-
ically lacks information, there are information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970; Budzinski & Ku-
chinke, 2020). Automatized and algorithmic recommendations are based on (big) data; con-
sumers do not (perfectly) know how recommendations are created. In various cases, consum-
ers are under-informed, which leads to asymmetric information at the expense of consumers. 
Nevertheless, we consider SRS to be unbiased for the theoretical framework. Incentives for 
service providers to bias information, search results and recommendations are discussed in 
Section 3 alongside the welfare effects. 
From an economic point of view (a) search and (b) recommendation systems are individual-
ized services and similar, yet not completely the same (Budzinski & Kuchinke, 2020). (a) 
Search algorithms are an “answer of the system” regarding active (pull) search actions, e.g. a 
Google search. The results need to be ranked – including a “recommendation information”, 
since higher placed results are (or seem to be) the better fit regarding the search command 
(Edelman, 2011). Therefore, the ranking in search results is also a recommendation for con-
sumers. Search algorithms usually recommend different alternatives (substitutes). Pure rec-
ommender systems (b), without active search command, recommend products or services 
(push) on a homepage without the consumer actively looking for it, e.g. landing-page or auto-
play1 function on YouTube. The system guides (leads or pushes) the consumer through pages 
(Belleflamme & Peitz, 2020), recommending (ostensible) useful content, products and infor-
mation. While the consumer passively receives recommendations, this can be substitutes 
(similar alternatives, laptop A or B) or complements (supplementing goods/services, USB 
stick for laptop A). 
Moreover, there are different types of recommendations in the modern world (see Figure 2). 
Recommendations can be suggested using media technologies (i.e. via some transmitting me-
dium, e.g. digitally with SRS) or non-media based (i.e. directly from person to person). In 
both cases, they can be differentiated from consumer to consumer (C2C) or business to con-
sumer (B2C). 
                                                          
1  Many media service providers use auto-play functions, for instance, YouTube plays the next video after the 
previous one is finished. 
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Figure 1 Types of Recommendations 
 
Focusing on the media-based side, ratings and reviews are generated through consumers. 
They are also digital recommendations, for instance, five stars as rating and text reviews for 
further information on the product on Amazon.  Reviews and ratings are C2C recommenda-
tions, containing information on “intra-product” level, about the specific good itself, for in-
stance, technical details on laptop A. This means the depth of information on a specific prod-
uct and its function, durability, features, etc. Their primary role is to reduce information 
asymmetries between seller and consumer. Reducing transaction cost (e.g. quickly comparing 
star ratings between laptop A and laptop B) is only a secondary function. SRS are B2C rec-
ommendations, providing information on “inter-product” level, comparing, ranking, and rec-
ommending different goods within the system. Therefore, mainly reducing transaction costs 
of searching and deciding between substitutes or finding complementary products, e.g. com-
paring laptop A and laptop B, suggesting a complementary USB stick. This overview shows 
that the types of recommendations have different functionality from a theoretical point of 
view; SRS mainly reduce transaction cost (inter-product), reviews and ratings mainly reduce 
information asymmetries (intra-product). Additionally, C2C reviews and ratings generate ad-
ditional data, which can be used as input for SRS. 
 
2.2  Recommendations in the Digital Age 
The increasing amount of data and sophisticated analyses in many industries shifted the aca-
demic focus towards SRS. With the progress of digitization, SRS gain importance in business 
models, since advanced methods are necessary to compete for consumers’ attention. Yet, SRS 
are not per se new phenomena of the digital age. Formerly, sellers and shop assistants recom-
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mended certain products or services. These recommendations were based on (1) the products 
in stock and (2) individual needs of consumers. From a theoretical point of view SRS changed 
in those two dimensions: 
(1) Shops had limited resources, regarding the service/product portfolio, for example, lack 
of space and storage rooms for various alternatives. Online markets are superior in of-
fering niche products, due to aggregate demand without local restraints and different 
storage/shipping opportunities (see the long-tail theory; Anderson, 2004). Moreover, 
limited human resources, i.e. the sales person played a vital role, knowing the com-
plete product portfolio and comparing goods exclusively for the individual consumer. 
(2) The degree of personalization changed with the available amount of consumer data 
and the means to analyze it (Belleflamme & Peitz, 2020). Where earlier the trained 
seller asked for wishes and preferences, algorithmic analysis of masses of consumer 
data make it possible to compare not only vast amounts of (1) a huge product portfo-
lio, but also give (2) individualized recommendations.2  Of course, a specific salesper-
son may know more about a specific (regular) consumer than any algorithmic system 
may ever do. However, looking at the mass of the cases, algorithms are likely to be 
superior. 
Automatized recommendations, based on detailed, individual information open new quality 
dimensions. Superior content suggestions, shopping advice, and search results can be pro-
duced by these advanced systems. Great business opportunities, but also a lot of innovative 
pressure, come with sophisticated SRS. Companies, which successfully implement SRS in 
their business, can profit hugely (historical examples: Google or Amazon). Providing fitting 
and efficient search results and recommendations can increase sales (i.e. upselling, cross-
selling), since consumers quickly find what they need, e.g. on Amazon. To lead consumers 
skillfully through products and contents can keep them longer on the platform and increase 
the time they spend, e.g., individualized selection of videos on Netflix or YouTube. Consum-
ers, who like the convenience and quality of recommendations will maximize their time using 
it and, thus, increase the probability of consuming information, advertising, or other goods. 
Moreover, the service providers build reputation, since consumers get used to the quality of 
recommendations, return to the website, or even recommend it to other people (which could 
                                                          
2  In IT-related literature, three different types of filter systems are typically distinguished for recommenda-
tions: (i) content-based, based on individual consumer history and similar products, (ii) collaborative filter-
ing, based on behavioral patterns of consumers with similar taste and preferences, and (iii) hybrid recom-
mender system combination of (i) and (ii) (Adomavicius & Tuzhilin, 2005; Gaenssle, 2021; Hinz & Eckert 
2010; Zhang et al., 2019). 
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kick-start direct and indirect network effects of modern digital platforms; Belleflamme & 
Peitz, 2020). Lastly, the analysis of consumer behavior, their response to the recommenda-
tions and different reactions to nudges and suggestions, can be used to further improve the 
SRS and, moreover, this information can also be part of the data analysis sold to third parties. 
Hence, the output data of SRS is, again, input for business models (see Introduction; i, ii, iii). 
 
3.  Economic Effects of Algorithmic Search and Recommendation Systems 
3.1  Literature Review  
While there is a more extensive literature on algorithmic search and recommendation systems 
from an information technology perspective, their treatment within economics has only re-
cently surfaced. Next to more general discussions of the economics behind algorithmic SRS 
and their role in the digital economy (Belleflamme & Peitz, 2018, 2020; Gaenssle & 
Budzinski, 2020), the question of welfare effects is addressed in a recent series of modeling 
papers. They do not discuss isolated, non-integrated SRS (see Figure 2, SRS Vertical Integra-
tion). Instead, they model a monopoly retail service (like a marketplace service or a streaming 
service) that includes an algorithmic SRS and two or more competing upstream providers of 
goods (content, commodities, or services), one of them being integrated with the retail ser-
vice, the other one(s) independent (Drugov & Jeon, 2018; De Cornière & Taylor, 2020; Pa-
dilla et al., 2020). Hagiu et al. (2020) add an outside option for the upstream goods’ providers 
(direct sale). Bourreau and Gaudin (2018) assume non-integrated upstream suppliers. The 
way they model demand and, consequently, the extent of heterogeneity among consumers in 
their models considerably differs between the studies. While the models are principally work-
ing for different types of retail services, Bourreau and Gaudin (2018) focus on streaming ser-




Figure 2 SRS – Vertical Integration 
 
In the absence of vertical integration, incentives for biasing SRS results occur if the retail ser-
vice earns more from selling goods from upstream company A than from upstream company 
B (bias in favor of the more profitable sales; De Cornière & Taylor, 2020). In doing so, SRS 
provider faces a trade-off between setting a high subscription fee and a high level of bias be-
cause the platform needs to compensate (marginal) subscribers for bias via a lower subscrip-
tion fee to ensure their participation (Bourreau & Gaudin, 2018). Thus, services offered at the 
price of zero (like the Google search engine or Amazon’s SRS) can afford a higher bias than 
services with a positive subscription price (like Netflix streaming service). Otherwise, vertical 
integration causes incentives to bias SRS results in favor of the own goods (self-preferencing; 
Drugov & Jeon, 2018; De Cornière & Taylor, 2020; Hagiu et al., 2020; Padilla et al., 2020). 
This bias is usually profitable for the vertically-integrated company but harmful for consumer 
and social welfare (Drugov & Jeon, 2018; Hagiu et al., 2020; Padilla et al., 2020). Only De 
Cornière and Taylor (2020) identify a case for non-harmful bias. They distinguish between 
“conflict” and “congruence” between the pay-offs of the integrated company and its consum-
ers: 
- “conflict”: the most efficient way for the integrated company to increase the utility of 
its product for the consumer is to reduce its per-unit mark-up, i.e. decrease the price. 
- “congruence”: the most efficient way for the integrated company to make its offer 
more attractive is to improve its upstream good so that it offers higher utility, thus in-
creasing the willingness-to-pay by consumers and allowing higher per-unit mark-ups, 


















In this scenario, bias is always harmful for consumer surplus under “conflict” because con-
sumers are mismatched more often and the favored (integrated) company offers lower utility 
than its (non-integrated) competitor. “Congruence” can be beneficial if the favored (integrat-
ed) company’s higher utility goods offset the mismatching but also harmful if it is the other 
way around. 
Even though this literature is still limited, inter alia, as to the monopoly assumption as well as 
with respect to actual consumer behavior, i.e. when and why do consumers actually follow 
SRS results, it informs our analysis of welfare effects and regulatory implication in the next 
sections. Notwithstanding, we go beyond the pure modeling literature. 
 
3.2  Positive Welfare Effects 
Using algorithmic SRS is beneficial and profitable for the companies (Budzinski & Kuchinke, 
2020). By providing individualized search rankings and recommendation services and thus 
(better) meeting the consumers’ individual preferences, companies can intensify the users’ 
transactions and consumption time with the respective service which in turn increases demand 
and turnover. According to Fleder and Hosanagar (2009), recommender systems can be ben-
eficial in three ways: turning browsing consumers into buyers, cross-selling as well as in-
creasing customer loyalty. Moreover, algorithmic SRS may also be used as a promotional tool 
for other goods offered by the same company. Profits are then derived from higher sales and 
uses of the upstream goods offered by the respective company. The longer and more extended 
the users spend time with a specific service provider the more personalized data (again) will 
be available to gather from the company. This includes learning from the reactions of the con-
sumers on the actual suggestions of the SRS and further improving the algorithms. This addi-
tionally gained data can then again be profitably used by the companies for: 
− further improvements of the individualized SRS, generating a self-reinforcing mecha-
nism. 
− vertical or horizontal integrated services of the company. Netflix and Amazon, for in-
stance, take advantage of user data from its streaming services that increase the com-
petitiveness of their own-productions of audiovisual content because they can better 
estimate what viewers probably like (Gaenssle, 2021). Facebook serves as a horizontal 
example by using personalized data from WhatsApp in order to optimize their Insta-
gram service. Profitability then originates from improving related goods and increas-
ing their usage and/or sales. 
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− third-parties who are willing to pay for the analysis of the data or its results, respec-
tively. Spotify, for instance, makes money by selling data analyses (the analysis result, 
not the data itself) upstream to the music industry. Another example presents targeted 
advertising. In that case, online services sell the result of their data analysis to adver-
tisers by placing their ads particularly to those consumers who, according to data-
based estimations, are the most probable ones to purchase the advertised goods.  
− data-based price discrimination. Here a company operates with its user data to esti-
mate the willingness-to-pay of individual consumers to adjust prices accordingly. 
Reaping consumers’ rents by individualized pricing is obviously highly profitable for 
the companies. 
Also, consumers benefit from algorithmic SRS causing positive effects on consumer welfare. 
In general, transaction costs can be reduced (see section 2). More precisely, search costs for 
the consumers are reduced (Hinz & Eckert, 2010; Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; Belleflamme & 
Peitz, 2018, 2020; Budzinski & Kuchinke, 2020). On the one hand, the internet itself reduces 
search costs compared to traditional offline markets (inter alia Ghose & Gu, 2006; Hinz & 
Eckert, 2010). On the other hand, digital markets are able to offer a much larger amount of 
goods compared to traditional brick and mortar stores which in turn considerably increases the 
amount of information available (information overload problems). This can be owed to the 
following reasons: i) storage costs are oftentimes significantly lower online which is even 
more the case if goods can be stored digitally, such as streaming services, ii) costs of geogra-
phy decrease in the digital world. This allows for offering niche products that meet the con-
sumers’ demand for goods which would be too dispersed for local stores to offer/store the 
good. Online, however, the so-called long-tail effect applies (inter alia, Anderson, 2004; 
Brynjolfsson et al., 2011) – the accumulation of demand for niche products makes the selling 
of these goods profitable. The vast amount of available goods and information, however, can 
cause information overload problems. Thus, search and recommendation tools seem to be 
highly important (Brynjolfsson et al. 2006) as they can offer pre-structuring assistance letting 
the consumers find more quickly what they are searching for. Due to the preference-oriented 
ranking of search results, consumers benefit from a better overview on relevant offers (in-
creasing market transparency).   
In addition to this, recommendations can provide decision support (Milano et al., 2020; Lee & 
Hosanagar, 2015). Through providing recommendations that match the users’ preferences 
decision costs can be reduced. The previously mentioned huge amount of available goods 
online compared to offline creates the so-called abundance-of-choice problem for users (in-
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formation overload). This in turn demands for external recommendations, with algorithmic 
recommendations being more suitable to cope with the vast amount of (big) data. According 
to Fleder and Hosanagar (2009), recommender systems can benefit the consumers by getting 
them aware of new products as well as facilitating product selection among the endless op-
tions available. Jannach et al. (2017) point at two additional aspects how recommender sys-
tems might positively influence consumers: i) by acting as reminders for products that the 
user had a prior interest for, ii) by pointing the attention to products that are currently price 
reduced. The effectiveness of algorithmic recommendations can be drawn from different em-
pirical studies confirming that most consumers choose among the top ranked recommenda-
tions and search results and do not look towards the lower ranked offers (Lorigo et al., 2006; 
Pan et al., 2007; Ghose & Yang, 2009). Also, Senecal and Nantel (2004) found in their empir-
ical research that recommender systems were the most influential recommendation source 
among different types of online recommendation sources (e.g. other consumers, human ex-
perts).3  
The improved market overview through algorithmic SRS also facilitates one-stop shopping 
behavior for the consumers online. This in turn could provide different advantages for the 
consumer compared to various single shopping activities at different shopping venues: i.e. 
less shopping costs (i.e. saving multiple delivery/shipping costs), time savings (focusing on 
one online shop instead of browsing multiple shops), convenience aspects (log-in data for 
only one shopping venue), privacy aspects (providing personal data to just one or a few num-
ber of online shops) as well as again a further reduction in search and decision costs (see 
above).  
The benefits are particularly high for consumers who have a high adversity against search and 
decision costs and least relevant for consumers who enjoy the search and decision process. 
Transferring the insights from behavioral economics about rule-following behavior (inter alia, 
Vanberg, 1994, 2002; Budzinski, 2003) to the digital age, consumers should particularly bene-
fit from algorithmic SRS in the case of low-key and routine consumption decisions than in the 
case of exceptional and outstanding important transactions. A good fit of the SRS’ data-based 
estimations with the preferences for routine consumption (which is often conducted satis-
fycing utility instead of maximizing utility) allow for a minimization of transaction costs (as 
search and decision costs). This is beneficial because it saves cognitive resources for non-
routine decisions where the consumption act is of paramount importance for the consumer. 
                                                          
3  Though regarding trustworthiness and expertise the recommender system performed not as good as other 
users and human experts (Senecal & Nantel, 2004). 
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Here, the SRS results are more likely to be critically reviewed and complemented by addi-
tional information, for instance from reviews and ratings or experts. Taking a Spotify-style 
streaming service as an example, an individual is likely to more or less blindly follow playlist 
recommendations when she comes from everyday work and just wants to relax a bit than in 
the case of a first rendezvous with a new love where the individual probably will want to 
make sure the right music is played and not “only something”.  
However, not only the preferences of consumers are heterogeneous but also their sensitivity 
towards algorithmic SRS differs. The spectrum may encompass extreme positions: a general 
distrust and skepticism towards algorithmic SRS (strong preference for self-determination) on 
the one end, leading to rejecting SRS suggestions as a matter of principle, and, on the other 
end, the notion that the algorithmic SRS anyhow knows better what I want than myself 
(Baumgartl-effect), resulting in a rather blind following of top ranked SRS results. In eco-
nomic terms, the recommendation-elasticity of demand differs among individuals, based upon 
relevance of search and decision costs as well as personal attitude towards algorithmic SRS. 
Benefits of SRS – but also negative effects – considerably depend on the individual shape of 
this recommendation elasticity. 
 
3.3  Negative Welfare Effects 
3.3.1 Consumption Bubble 
The creation of automatized algorithmic recommendations based on individualized prefer-
ences can lead consumers into a specific direction and create path dependency. The consumer 
information is analyzed by the system that generates suitable recommendations. SRS conse-
quently influence which content is displayed to recipients and either presented on top of 
search lists or remain hidden i.e. listed among the last results (Bozdag, 2013). Iterative feed-
back loops lead to learning processes and suggestions according to the consumer’s (first and 
subsequent) interests. This can fuel the development of so-called filter bubbles and echo 
chambers.4 Since these terms are mainly used for news consumption, we refer to this more 
generally, as consumption bubbles. Stuck in a consumption bubble, consumers only receive 
recommendations closely related to their main interests and do not get confronted with new, 
surprising contents anymore, which reduces diversity. The great advantage of SRS, reducing 
                                                          
4  There is a broad literature on media bias and filter bubbles in news markets (inter alia, Borgesius Zuiderveen 




transaction cost and information overload, can subsequently become a disadvantage and wel-
fare reducing. 
There are different factors, which influence the development of consumption bubbles. The 
more points are fulfilled (and the stronger in itself), the higher is the probability of a con-
sumption bubble. 
− Homogeneous preferences for the recommended good: SRS recommend according to 
the individual consumer’s preferences. If they are very homogeneous regarding the 
recommended good, there is no need to provide further or other information. The sys-
tem’s suggestions will usually vary among the same good/service types without large 
variance. 
− The presence of naïve consumers (Heidhues & Köszegi, 2017): Consumers who are 
not skeptical towards SRS and simply rely on recommendations without further re-
search or critical consideration (see section 3.2). The probability to get stuck in a con-
sumption bubble increases with naiveté, as there is no critical examination of outside 
opportunities. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the majority of consumers is 
not aware of pre-selection and algorithmic filtering (in social media; Rader & Gray, 
2015). 
− Simplicity of one-stop shopping: It is very convenient to receive all goods and ser-
vices in one place. Transaction costs of information sharing (giving personal data, 
payment data etc.) are lower. Consequently, the consumer relies on the recommenda-
tion of one shop, without checking outside options. 
− Building consumption capital (Stigler & Becker, 1977; Adler, 1985): Consumers col-
lect specific knowledge on two dimensions (i) the system they are using, (ii) the 
goods/services they are consuming. On level (i) consumers get to know the service 
and its SRS; they know how to use the system, where to klick, what recommendations 
they like and use, e.g. knowing how to filter Amazon shopping lists. On (ii) they get to 
know specific offers and products (especially for reoccurring or serial consumption), 
e.g. Netflix Originals. This way, consumers can build taste and knowledge in a specif-
ic direction (Stigler & Becker, 1977).  
From a normative perspective, the individual consumer might be happy in a comfortable con-
sumption bubble, without (irrelevant) outside information, which could increase decision 
costs or cognitive dissonance. Yet, this path-dependency might not always be welfare enhanc-
ing; only an experienced consumer with settled and well-established preferences, who exactly 
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knows what she likes, is sure that she does not miss something. The consumer builds con-
sumption capital in one direction, but there is no creation of taste etc. in another direction. 
Therefore, she misses opportunities, learning processes and taste-building chances.  
Moreover, from a collective point of view on society, consumption bubbles might lead to 
problems on a bigger scale and in the long run. On the one hand, the segregation of various 
small bubbles can reduce social cohesion, mutual understanding and collective develop-
ment/innovation. In media sectors,5 the co-existence of various small but segregated bubbles 
can weaken the cultural identity, which can be important for solidarity and social cohesion, 
for instance, loss of nation-wide music hits that everybody knows due to individual streaming 
bubbles. However, critical voices find no empirical evidence of those effects so far (Borgesius 
Zuiderveen et al., 2016; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011; Pogorelskiy & Shum, 2019). On the other 
hand, the creation of one major bubble can lead to loss of diversity and individuality. All con-
sumers build the same consumption capital and collective knowledge is minimized to the 
same standards (race-to-the-bottom). The individual knowledge does not differ, thus, the de-
pendency on a specific system can increase, for example, depending on specific knowledge on 
Apple/Windows systems. The specific knowledge increases switching costs, which can 
strengthen market power positions (with all incentives of abuse) in the long run. 
 
3.3.2 Scale Effects and Monopolization 
One of the marked differences between the recommending salesperson in a physical shop and 
an algorithmic SRS implemented by an online service relates to the resulting market structure. 
In stark contrast to the more decentralized classic recommendation competence of human 
experts (scattered across millions of shops, organizations, etc.), algorithmic SRS represent a 
strong centralization of recommendation knowledge. Based upon big data input, one big algo-
rithm (or one system of integrated algorithms) produces individualized search rankings and 
recommendations. Furthermore, the fundamental centralization of knowledge is accompanied 
by the dependence of the quality of search and recommendation results on the amount of data 
input: more data input leads to better estimations of consumer’s preferences and, thus, to bet-
ter SRS performance. Scale effects advantage big SRS suppliers over smaller ones and create 
barriers to entry for newcomers. This favors a market structure with either a narrow oligopoly 
                                                          
5  More severe effects can be found in news markets, with implications for democratic values and political 
decisions (see Borgesius Zuiderveen et al., 2016). This important research field is, however, not the main fo-
cus of this paper. 
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of few big global players or even one leading supplier enjoying a dominant position. Without 
any countervailing effects, even a monopoly would be feasible for the SRS market. 
However, there are some countervailing factors. First, the law of diminishing marginal returns 
also holds true for algorithmic SRS: while more data is always useful, the additional ad-
vantage of more data decreases beyond a certain threshold. Thus, the quality differences 
among suppliers all working with big data amounts becomes negligible and hardly recogniza-
ble for imperfectly informed, behavioral consumers. Second, personalized data, which is the 
resource feeding the algorithms, is non-rival in character and can be reproduced by the con-
sumers. Hence, it is not exclusive to one SRS. Consumers can reveal their personal data to 
many services without exhaustion of the good “personal data” and many online services can 
parallel track the same consumer and her browsing and consumption behavior. Consequently, 
the data feeding the algorithms is non-exclusive and every smaller SRS supplier or newcomer 
can amass the necessary data to become competitive with the incumbents. This does require 
some investment so that the SRS market is not perfectly contestable. However, this is hardly 
different from other markets. Third, technological switching costs between SRS are low, so 
that competing services can attract users on the merit.6 
Altogether, it appears to be unlikely that algorithmic SRS lead to a monopoly. However, pro-
viders of algorithmic SRS enjoy more market power than traditional SRS do.  
 
3.3.3 Bias 
If providers of SRS experience incentives to bias the ranking of search results and recommen-
dations, consumer welfare may be jeopardized in favor of the profits of the SRS providers. A 
priori, biasing SRS should be negative for SRS profits because maximizing the fit with indi-
vidual consumer preferences is profitable and deviating from this may drive consumers away 
from using the service (see section 3.2). As such, algorithmic SRS c.p. enhance consumer 
welfare. Notwithstanding this general insight, SRS providers may experience scope for profit-
able bias under certain circumstances (see also section 3.1). This scope differs between non-
integrated and vertically integrated SRS providers – and amongst the latter the type of vertical 
integration matters as well (see Section 3.1, Figure 2, SRS Vertical Integration).  
For non-integrated SRS providers, biases can be profitable if the SRS provider benefits from 
consumers choosing specific goods from the search results and recommendations over others. 
                                                          




Assume the provider of a SRS earns different margins depending on which goods the con-
sumer chooses from the search and recommendation lists. Examples include comparison ser-
vices where upstream suppliers pay for each consumer directed to them through this compari-
son website (pay-per-click) or search engine services. Then, the SRS provider experiences 
incentives to recommend preferably goods where its profit margin is highest as well as to rank 
these items systematically higher in search results, independent of the estimated consumer’s 
preference. Obviously, this incentive is even stronger when upstream suppliers directly pay 
for better SRS rankings.  
The case of vertical integration I (see Figure 2) is similar but increases incentives to bias be-
cause more variables influences profit margins, so that they are more likely to differ between 
upstream good suppliers. For instance, streaming services are likely to negotiate different roy-
alties with different upstream content providers and marketplace services are likely to draw 
differing retail margins from different upstream goods. They then experience incentives to 
rank the contents and goods with the higher profit margin systematically higher. While such a 
bias is profitable, it reduces consumer welfare and, in total, harms social welfare (Bourreau & 
Gaudin, 2018). The scope for bias is limited by the intensity of competition (Bourreau & 
Gaudin, 2018; De Cornière & Taylor, 2020; Hagiu et al., 2020) and the sensitivity of con-
sumers to biased recommendations (Bourreau & Gaudin, 2018; De Cornière & Taylor, 
2020).  
Vertical integration II (see Figure 2) generates an additional incentive for harmful algorithmic 
search and recommendation bias, namely the so-called self-preferencing. If the SRS provider 
is vertically integrated to the extent that some of the goods ranked in his search and recom-
mendation lists are from the same company or the same group of companies, then biasing the 
results in favor of these goods can even be profitable if it drives some consumers away. As 
long as the additional sales of the upstream goods offset the marginal losses of SRS usage, an 
integrated company finds it profitable to bias its SRS. For instance, the European Commission 
(2017) found in its GoogleShopping case that Alphabet-Google deliberately biased its Goog-
leSearch service in order to steer the traffic towards GoogleShopping and away from compet-
ing comparison services. According to the European Commission (2017), this was done by 
implementing a penalty points system into the algorithm, which downgraded the ranking of 
specific competitors of GoogleShopping in the search rankings, so that they disappeared from 
the first page of search results. The strategy was successful as it significantly changed the 
market shares of online comparison services in favor of GoogleShopping and at the expense 
of its competitors, but it harmed social welfare (European Commission, 2017). According to 
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the state of research (see section 3.1), the probability of harmful self-preferencing increases 
with the following characteristics: 
- higher market power in the SRS market. 
- higher market power in the retailing market with which the SRS is integrated 
(Bourreau & Gaudin, 2018; De Cornière & Taylor, 2020; Hagiu et al., 2020). 
- higher market shares (even below traditional market power thresholds but of course 
also beyond those) of the integrated firm on the upstream market of the goods/contents 
that are listed in search rankings and recommendations (Drugov & Jeon, 2018). 
- larger insensitivity of consumers to biased recommendations (Bourreau & Gaudin, 
2018; De Cornière & Taylor, 2020), i.e. lower bias elasticity of demand, for instance 
due to higher search costs for consumers wanting to circumvent the biasing SRS 
(Bourreau & Gaudin, 2018), but also due to other factors. 
- the existence of essential “superstar” or “must-have” content/goods because, again, 
consumers find it more difficult to avoid the biasing retail service (Bourreau & 
Gaudin, 2018). 
- smaller quality or utility differences between the goods/contents from the integrated 
and the non-integrated upstream providers (De Cornière & Taylor, 2020; Padilla et 
al., 2020) because consumers are likely to find it more difficult to detect bias. 
- more saturated or more mature markets (Padilla et al., 2020), i.e. when growth dy-
namics in the primary markets of the biasing services (i.e. the streaming market or the 
underlying hardware market as in the case of SRS by smartphone app stores) start to 
slow down. 
- more or more likely options to personalize subscription prices (Bourreau & Gaudin, 
2018). 
The more of these characteristics are given and the higher the extent of that is, the higher is 
the probability of the occurrence of harmful self-preferencing. Further research is likely to 
identify more characteristics along these lines. 
Altogether, welfare-harming biasing of algorithmic SRS plays only a minor role if the SRS 
provider is independent or if vertical integration is limited to the retailer level. In these cases, 
the probability of harmful bias is not zero. However, it depends on considerable market pow-
er, severely limiting alternatives to the dominant SRS for consumers. Effective competition 
erodes the incentives for biases.  Things look different if vertical integration extends to up-
stream levels which provide/sell the goods that get ranked by the SRS (vertical integration II 
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in Figure 2). This represents the problematic case where harmful bias in the form of self-
preferencing must be expected to prevail. 
 
3.3.4 Privacy 
Whenever personalized data is collected, processed, and commercially analyzed, issues of 
privacy play a relevant role. Obviously, privacy is a multi-disciplinary issue. However, in the 
context of our analysis, privacy matters with respect to its effects on welfare. The economics 
of privacy (overview: Acquisti et al., 2016) analyze under which conditions market players 
(including consumers) make welfare-optimal decisions regarding the revelation or disguise of 
personal data. The modern literature that focuses on online markets emphasizes information 
asymmetries at the expense of consumers: if consumers cannot know for what and by whom 
their data is commercially used, they cannot make a rational decision about its provision and 
inefficiencies occur (inter alia, Taylor, 2004; Acquisti & Varian, 2005; Hermalin & Katz, 
2006). Similarly, a lack of competition, i.e. a lack of alternatives for consumers to choose 
between, causes welfare harm (Kerber, 2016). Personal data may be overprovided compared 
to the aspired level of privacy and the commercial value of data may be undervalued 
(Budzinski & Kuchinke, 2020).  
Consumers can get a relatively proper idea that their data is used to rank search results and 
provide individualized recommendations when using a service with an algorithmic SRS. Usu-
ally, they will not know how the algorithm exactly works but in the absence of hidden bias 
(see above) and the presence of effective competition this should be no problem as they can 
assess whether the recommendations match their preferences or not. However, if the SRS 
provider processes or sells the personalized data to third parties for further commercial pur-
poses, it becomes less likely that the consumer can anticipate the commercial use and value of 
its data provision. This is further fueled by the common phenomenon that consumers largely 
ignore available information about data usage and privacy conditions provided by service 
providers in their general terms and conditions (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). The Cam-
bridge Analytica case provides an example where most consumers were not aware of a third-
party use of their data (although perhaps based more on political than commercial purposes) 
as does the German antitrust case against Facebook’s non-transparent data extraction through 
third parties (inter alia, Budzinski, Grusevaja & Noskova, 2020). Note, however, that this pri-
vacy issue does not apply if an SRS provider sells the results of its data analysis and does not 
trade the data itself. Spotify’s business of selling streaming data analysis to the upstream mu-
sic industry represents such an example.  
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4.  Implications and Conclusion 
4.1  Managerial Implications 
SRS present efficient and helpful tools for digital operating companies (e.g. online shops, 
(social) media services) by providing consumers with pre-structuring assistance for dealing 
with the vast amount of products, services and information available, thus, facilitating pur-
chasing and/or consumption decisions (i.e. reducing transaction costs). Consumers value such 
form of personalized recommendation, with many consumers tending to click on the top 
ranked search and recommendation results. Also, different companies (e.g. Amazon, Netflix) 
reveal that a considerable percentage of consumption is already based on recommendation 
systems (see section 1). SRS have the potential to increase profits – i.e. generating cross- and 
up-selling opportunities by making their customers aware of new products, price reduced 
products that otherwise probably would not be purchased, niche products that meet the indi-
vidual demands of their customers (in line with the long-tail effect) as well as reminding them 
of products they had a previous interest in (see section 3.2). The better the algorithmic SRS 
meet the personal needs of the individual consumers the more time and/or money they will 
spent with the respective service. By doing so, reputation can be built, leading to customer 
loyalty (consumers put trust in the companies’ recommendation), one-stop shopping behavior 
by satisfied consumers and/or positively influencing C2C recommendations ((digital) word of 
mouth effects, e.g. recommending the service/shop to a friend who becomes a new customer). 
Companies should therefore continuously analyze (consumer) data as well as evaluate the 
success of the given SRS (i.e. was the recommendation actually used by the consumers and 
led to further purchases and/or consumption) in order to further improve the algorithms. Thus, 
the availability and thorough analysis of (big) data (i.e. basic, advanced and derived consumer 
data), plays a crucial role for the functioning and enhancement of the SRS.7 In addition to 
this, further business models, such as the use of third-party services (e.g. targeted advertising), 
vertical or horizontal integrated services as well as individualized pricing can be positively 
influenced. 
Last but not least, this article has elaborated a distinction of different forms of recommenda-
tions, going along with different functionalities (e.g. B2C vs. C2C recommendations). Com-
panies should be aware of these differences, trying to combine different recommendation 
types in order to positively influence consumers’ consumption and/or purchasing decisions. 
For instance, whereas for routine consumption SRS might suffice more important transactions 
                                                          
7  At the same time, however, companies should be aware of possible privacy concerns by the consumers in 
revealing (too much) personal data.  
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should be actively accompanied with the promotion of C2C recommendations such as ratings 
and reviews in order to strengthen credibility in the respective algorithmic recommendation 
and reduce information asymmetries.8 By doing so, also possible privacy concerns of the con-
sumers could be reduced. 
Since algorithm-based SRS increasingly come under scrutiny of regulatory authorities and 
governments (see section 1), companies employing such SRS should safeguard that they 
comply without antitrust and consumer protection laws. This particularly refers to incentives 
to bias search rankings and recommendations. While such biasing strategies may be profitable 
in the short run, they fuel the tightening of competition rules and promote public regulation of 
algorithmic SRS. Especially the latter entails the danger of far-reaching interventions into 
business models and commercial opportunities as well as into managerial freedom. With-
standing incentives to self-preferencing – as profitable as that may be in the short-run – repre-
sents an important element to prevent far-reaching government intervention into this market. 
 
4.2  Regulatory Implications 
Regulatory implications need to highlight the beneficial character and consumer-welfare en-
hancing elements of algorithmic SRS. Any regulatory intervention should aim to preserve the 
comprehensive advantages and pinpoint combating welfare-decreasing practices. Even though 
research on this comparatively new service, which is still dynamically developing, is ongoing, 
the state-of-the-art already offers a number of valuable insights. First, negative welfare effects 
are likely to surface in specific market constellations. Consequently, a general industry-wide 
sector regulation of SRS represents an inadequate regulatory tool since it does not pinpoint 
the problematic cases but imposes a one-size-fits-all regulation upon everything including the 
welfare-enhancing cases. This would create a number of negative side-effects like slowing 
down of innovation, eroding incentives to service improvements, burdening significant regu-
latory costs on business and taxpayers (also through a dynamically self-reinforcing enforce-
ment bureaucracy), and entailing the danger of initiating an intervention spiral. This is par-
ticularly dangerous if regulatory authorities try to regulate what consumers should receive as 
search rankings and recommendations – for instance, in order to break-up consumption bub-
bles or prevent biased SRS. Due to unavoidable imperfect regulatory knowledge and self-
interests of regulatory authorities, consumers are likely to become restricted in their freedom 
of choice and end up with even more welfare losses in such scenarios. 
                                                          
8  Additionally, such data can again be incorporated in the algorithm of the SRS. 
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Since the profitable employment of welfare-harming biases of search rankings and distorted 
recommendations considerably depends on market power and vertical integration, especially 
of type II (see figure 2 and sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), competition policy represents an ade-
quate tool to effectively and precisely address welfare-reducing business strategies. In con-
trast to sector regulation, competition authorities executing antitrust law only intervene into 
cases, where negative consumer welfare effects actually occur – and stay away from all other 
cases, thus, leaving innovation incentives as well as business and consumer freedom more 
intact. In doing so, competition policy may use a wide range of instruments, depending on the 
respective laws in each jurisdiction. The strongest intervention would be to break-up powerful 
companies in several smaller entities, for instance in order to reduce horizontal market power 
or to end vertical integration. The dual role problem of the same company acting as a SRS 
service and as an upstream seller of recommended goods, which generates considerable and 
problematic self-preferencing incentives could be effectively solved by breaking-up such 
companies and create mutually independent firms on the different supply-chain stages. Such 
an intervention may increase social welfare if price competition is more relevant in a given 
market than quality/utility competition (De Cornière & Taylor, 2020). Otherwise, however, 
breaking-up the integrated firm may decrease social welfare because of a reduction both in 
innovation dynamics and service quality for the consumer (Hagiu et al., 2020). However, a 
general prohibition of self-preferencing always increases consumer welfare (De Cornière & 
Taylor, 2020; Hagiu et al., 2020) and if self-preferencing is combined with market power, i.e. 
upstream competitors are dependent on the integrated company, also total welfare (Hagiu et 
al., 2020). While prohibiting self-preferencing implies to intervene against a specific practice 
in a specific market, the more general introduction of a neutrality obligation requiring a ran-
domized order of search and recommendation rankings reduces welfare because it softens 
competition between the upstream goods/content providers (De Cornière & Taylor, 2020), 
thus eroding the procompetitive effect of algorithmic search and recommendation systems. 
Enforcing transparency policies improving consumers’ knowledge about the bias (but not in 
the sense of revealing the properties of the algorithm) yield ambiguous results (De Cornière 
& Taylor, 2020). 
Thus, empowering competition policy to combat self-preferencing represents the preferable 
regulatory avenue. In most jurisdictions, the current laws should allow for intervening against 
harmful self-preferencing of dominant companies as it constitutes an abuse of dominance. 
Still, it requires to go beyond the predominant antitrust philosophy of focusing on horizontal 
practices and re-activate both the critical view on vertical (and conglomerate) effects 
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(Budzinski & Stöhr, 2019) and the enforcement against exclusionary abuses (Bougette et al., 
2019). However, the application of traditional market power concepts is limited in digital 
markets and harmful may also appear below the thresholds of market dominance. Therefore, 
an enhancement of the tools of competition authorities is necessary to effectively combat anti-
competitive SRS-strategies. The extension of the antitrust market power concepts to embrace 
systemic market power in digital ecosystems represents a promising way forward (Budzinski, 
Gaenssle & Stöhr, 2020). In Germany, the currently ongoing reform of competition rules in-
cludes the introduction of a position of “outstanding relevance across markets” (ORAM), 
which seeks to cover systemic market power in digital ecosystems. A consequence of identi-
fying such a position would then be to prohibit certain business behaviors including, inter alia, 
self-preferencing. Similar ideas are discussed on the European level although, here, also the 
idea of a comprehensive sector regulation covering also algorithmic SRS is not yet off the 
agenda.   
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